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A Call to Peace: How Third-Party
Actors and Frameworks Impacted the
Peace Processes of Northern Ireland
and Colombia
Esther Holm
History and Government

Introduction

I

t is undeniable that the end of the Cold War ushered in a new era. During the Cold
War, the world was bound in a West versus East paradigm. However, the collapse of
the Soviet Union also signaled the collapse of this paradigm. The world was no longer
bipolar. 1 The end of the bipolar system impacted how peace processes occurred across the
world. Many of the conflicts that occurred during the Cold War were largely proxy battles
between the Soviet Union and the United States (Crocker, Hampson, & Aall, 1999). Thus,
the post-Cold War era conflicts were largely local wars and intra-state conflicts. In fact,
today, nearly four out of every five conflicts are predominantly internal (Tonge, 2014).
The change in the world system also ushered in changes in how peace processes occurred.
For instance, the end of the Cold War freed international organizations and small and
medium powers from the bipolar restraints.2 As such, these organizations and countries
have become more involved in mediation and peace processes (Crocker et al., 1999).
In the most basic sense, a peace process is, “A process aimed at bringing violence and
armed struggle to an end” (Armengol, 2013). However, as with most cases, it is much more
In International relations, polarity is a way to describe the distribution of power. A unipolar system
describes a world or a region where one state is described as a great power and has more influence than any
other state. A bipolar system is a world or system where there two great powers (such as the Cold War
system where the United States and the Soviet Union were the two great powers.) Finally, a multipolar world
describes a world or system where there are multiple great powers. For more information on polarity see The
Tragedy of Great Powers by John Mearscheimer.
1

An innovation that has occurred in mediation since the end of the Cold War is a concept known as the group
of “Friends.” These “Friends” are essentially friends of the peace process. They are an informal mini coalition
of states and/or intergovernmental organizations that have an interest in seeing peace accomplished. United
Nations’ peacekeeping organizations often benefits from having groups of “Friends” working alongside and
supporting them; between 1990 and 2009, “Friends, “contact groups, and “core groups” grew from four to
more than thirty. For more on groups of “Friends” see Working with Groups of Friends by Teresa Whitfield.
2
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complex than this simple definition. In Comparative Peace Processes, international relations
scholar, Jonathan Tonge, defines a peace process as,
The active attempt at the prevention and management of conflict between and
within states, a remit covering the treatment of inter-state, inter-communal and
intra-communal violence. The term peace process requires the following: the
involvement of most combatants; the cessation of conflict (peace); the formulation
and implementation of political arrangements, whether interim or comprehensive
accords; the prevention of the re-ignition of conflict (process) and the attempted
political management of differences (Tonge, 2014).
Guns and Government further clarifies the criteria needed for a peace process to qualify as a
peace process. These criteria are that the protagonists are willing to negotiate in good faith,
the key actors are included in the process, the negotiations address the central issues in
dispute, the negotiators do not use force to achieve their objectives, and the negotiators are
committed to a sustained process. Within these criteria, there are a variety of roles that
third-party actors can play in the peace process (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002).
Once a peace process has begun there are three basic stages: the pre-negotiation, the
negotiation, and the implementation of the agreement (Fisas, 2013). The pre-negotiation
stage is crucial as it helps determine whether the parties involved in the discussions are
committed to a peace process; it is also where the safety of the negotiators is guaranteed.
This is an important step, since no party will enter into a peace negotiation without their
safety being guaranteed. The pre-negotiation stage also lays out the “oadmap that will
guide the rest of the peace process. Furthermore, the pre-negotiation stage determines the
role that third-party actors will play in the peace process. The next stage, the negotiation
stage, is typically the longest stage. This is where the parties will actually negotiate the
peace process. In this stage it is important that key players negotiate the peace deal,
although this may mean inviting difficult personalities to the negotiating table. If all goes
well in the negotiating stage, the peace process will move to the final stage, which is the
implementation of the peace deal (Fisas, 2013).
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When discussing peace processes, it is important to remember that peace should not be
thought of as culminating in a peace deal. Rather, it should be thought of as a long process,
which is why this paper focuses on processes rather than deals. In fact, in some cases it can
be detrimental to a peace process to focus on the deal, because it can cause the neglect of
other areas. Additionally, peace processes carry on after peace deals are signed and are
crucial to implementing the deals. A peace deal is by no means a guarantee of peace. There
have been numerous peace deals signed that ended in violence (Tonge, 2014).
I became interested in studying peace processes because I grew up as a missionary kid in
Panama. Two years before I was born, coworkers of my parents were kidnapped by FARC
guerillas. While I was not around for the kidnapping, I experienced the aftermath. Although
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the bodies were never found, in 2001, they declared the missionaries to be dead, an event
that I do remember. Furthermore, I remember my parents having to do training in case
they were ever kidnapped. As an eight-year-old in boarding school, I had a small bag
packed so I was ready to leave at a moment’s notice. Overall, I remember being terrified
that either my parents or I would get kidnapped by FARC. Because of my background, I was
especially interested when the Colombian government signed a peace deal with FARC in
2016. As I did further research, I realized that both the Colombian peace process and the
Northern Irish peace process made excellent case studies to help better understand how
peace processes occur.
There are two peace processes that well exemplify the peace processes following the ColdWar. The first is the peace process between the Irish Republic Army and the English
government in Northern Ireland. The tensions in Ireland stretch back centuries. The
modern conflict began in 1921 with the creation of Northern Ireland. However, the conflict
began in earnest in the 1960s during a period known as the Troubles. It wasn’t until the
1980s that the peace process led to the Good Friday agreement in 1998 (Mac Ginty, &
Darby 2002). The second is the peace process in Colombia between the Left-Wing guerrilla
groups and the Colombian government. The conflict between the two groups began in the
1960s and produced the largest number of internally displaced people in the world at that
time (Maldonado, 2017). Peace talks began in 2012, and the peace deal was ratified in
2016. Both peace processes began in the post-Cold War era (For statistical analysis see
Figure 1). As such, they benefited from the involvement of third-party actors. Additionally,
the Colombian and Northern Ireland peace processes were connected via Juan Manuel
Santos, who was the President of Colombia during their peace process. When he was a
young man, President Santos spent time in the United Kingdom. While there, he
experienced an IRA bombing. While he escaped uninjured, he was still greatly impacted by
the experience. Santos credits the Good Friday Agreement with inspiring him to push for
the peace process in Colombia. He also credits the Northern Irish peace process for many
elements of the Colombian peace process (“Colombia's President Juan Manuel Santos
recalls IRA bomb while student in London,” 2016). Comparing the peace processes of
Northern Ireland and Colombia showcases the importance of third-party actors and
demonstrates the necessity of having a framework for a successful peace process, prior to
beginning the official talks.

Literature Review
Since the Cold War ended, there has been an increase in peace deals and peace processes
across the world. Because of this, there have been ample opportunities for scholars to
study and examine how peace processes work. Since the end of the Cold War, there has
been a shift in how peace deals are carried out. Notably, third-party mediators have
become much more involved in peacekeeping and peacemaking. Additionally,
organizations, such as the United Nations have taken a huge role in conflict mediation
(Crocker et al., 1999). It is critical to the understanding of conflict mediation to think of
peace as a process rather than an event that culminates in a peace deal. Guns and
Government defines a peace process as needing to meet five criteria. These criteria are that
the protagonists are willing to negotiate in good faith, the key actors are included in the
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process, the negotiations address the central issues in dispute, the negotiators do not use
force to achieve their objectives, and the negotiators are committed to a sustained process.
Within these criteria, there are plenty of roles that third-party actors can play in the peace
process (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002).
In their book Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World, Crocker, Hampson,
and Aall discuss two basic paradigms that are used when discussing third-party mediation.
These paradigms are the structuralist and the social-psychological. The structuralist
paradigm is held by those who have a rational view of the world. The mediators in this
paradigm are very active in the negotiation process. They coax the participants to the
negotiating table through a method of “carrots” and “sticks.” Essentially, in this paradigm
the third-party mediators lead the parties to the conflict through the negotiation process.
The idea of “ripeness” is very important to the structuralist paradigm. Essentially, ripeness
is the idea that timing is important to peace processes. For example, if war weariness has
settled in and people are tired of the conflict, third-party mediators may have an easier
time leading parties involved in a conflict to the negotiating table (Crocker et al., 1999).
In contrast, the social-psychological paradigm has the third-party actors playing a much
less involved role. This paradigm focuses heavily on the communication aspect of peace
processes. In this paradigm, third-party actors facilitate communication. They provide
forums for the conflicting parties to dialogue with each other. This school of thought holds
a much less realist view of the world than the structuralist school; the social-psychological
paradigm sees conflict as subjective. Because of this, it is important to understand the
perspective that both sides of the conflict have. In this approach, the third-party mediators’
job is simply to facilitate the negotiations to help both sides better understand one another,
which is a goal they often accomplish through the hosting of workshops. This school of
thought allows the parties of the conflict to have total ownership over whatever peace
process occurs. Unlike in the structuralist approach, the third-party actors are not leading
the parties through the negotiations (Crocker et al., 1999).
The idea of “ripeness”, as discussed in the structuralist paradigm, is well illustrated by the
Good Friday Agreement. The Good Friday Agreement ended twenty-five years of violence
and eight centuries of conflict in Northern Ireland (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002). After eight
centuries of conflict, many people living in Northern Ireland were ready for peace. Often
peace processes take place when the idea of continuing with violence is unthinkable. Sadly,
as in the case of Northern Ireland, getting to this place can take centuries. The background
to this conflict is complex. Northern Ireland has a Protestant majority and a Catholic
minority. (See Figure 1) These two groups of people tended to see the conflict through
different lenses. The Protestants largely tended to view it in constitutional and security
terms. Their main goal for any peace deal was to preserve Northern Ireland’s relationship
with Great Britain (See Figure 2). In contrast, Catholics viewed it either an issue of
nationalist struggle for self-determination or as a problem of corruption or unfair practices
by Unionist governments (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002).
Although this conflict stretches back for centuries, for the purpose of this discussion, 1921
is a good place to start. In 1921, the island of Ireland was divided. The southern twenty-six
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counties became independent of Great Britain, whereas the six north-eastern counties
remained part of the United Kingdom and became Northern Ireland. From its creation,
Northern Ireland contained a Protestant majority and a Catholic minority. Because of this,
tension between the two groups was never far off. This tension culminated in the late
1960s, in a period that became known as the Troubles. The Catholic minority began
campaigning through demonstrations. Protestants, in turn, responded with counterdemonstrations. The unrest did not stop here. London sent in the army to keep the peace.
However, the Catholic minority, who viewed the army as a symbol of oppression,
responded with the paramilitary group the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA/IRA)
(Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002).
However, during the years of violence the seeds for the peace process were being sown. In
1985, the Anglo-Irish agreement made a working relationship between the United
Kingdom and Ireland on the issue of Northern Ireland feasible. In the 1990s an important
shift occurred, which strengthened the possibility of a peace process. This shift was the
inclusion of political parties connected to paramilitary groups in the peace process (Mac
Ginty, & Darby 2002). With this inclusion, the talks met the definition of a peace process, as
defined in the introduction, by including the key actors in the talks.
An important aspect of the Northern Ireland Peace Process was the concept of the threestrand framework. Each strand, in this framework, represented a different relationship
within the British Isles. The first strand represented the relationship between the two
communities in Northern Ireland, while the second strand represented the relationship
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The third strand represented the
relationship between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Each of these would
be essential to the peace process, since every peace deal would have to address each strand
(Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002).
After lengthy negotiations, the Good Friday Agreement was reached on April 10, 1998,
Good Friday.3 Five constitutional provisions were essential to the agreement as outlined in
Guns and Government:
First, Northern Ireland’s future constitutional status was to be in the hands of its
citizens. Second, if the people of Ireland, north and south, wanted a united Ireland,
they could have one by voting for it. Third, Northern Ireland’s current constitutional
position would remain within the United Kingdom. Fourth, Northern Ireland’s
citizens would have the right to ‘identify themselves and be accepted as Irish or
British, or both.’ Fifth, the Irish state would drop its territorial claim on Northern
Ireland and instead define the Irish nation in terms of people rather than land (Mac
Ginty, & Darby 2002).
As can be seen in these constitutional provisions, the Good Friday Agreement addressed
each strand in the three-strand framework. Additionally, the agreement was given the
democratic seal of approval through a referendum. A copy of it was delivered to every
home in Northern Ireland, giving every citizen of Northern Ireland a chance to read it
3

The Good Friday Agreement is also referred to as the Belfast Agreement (Elliott, M. 2007).
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before the referendum, which would decide the fate of the agreement. On May 22, 1998
two referendums were held simultaneously in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland
to decide upon the agreement. In Northern Ireland, seventy-one percent of the population
voted in favor of the agreement, while in the Republic of Ireland, ninety-four percent
backed the agreement (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002)
In The Conflict Resolution Quarterly article, Hancock, Weiss, and Duerr, discuss how the
peace deal in Northern Ireland was framed. Political leaders utilized prospect theory, which
says, “Individuals overvalue losses, the certainty effect means that people will engage in
more risk to avoid losses viewed as certain than to secure gains viewed as merely
probably” (Hancock, Wiess, & Duerr, 2010). The framers of the Good Friday Agreement
essentially took advantage of human nature. Since people are risk adverse, they framed the
Good Friday Agreement as the best way to avoid continued violence (Hancock et al., 2010).
Northern Ireland was experiencing a type of war weariness. Thus, they were able to use the
idea of “ripeness”, an idea that is central to the structuralist paradigm mentioned in
Herding Cats (Crocker et al., 1999).
Third-party actors also played an important role in the Northern Irish peace process. One
of the actors was United States’ President Bill Clinton. In his article “The United States, Irish
Americans and Northern Ireland Peace”, Guelke provides a thorough background on the
United States’ involvement in the peace process in Northern Ireland. He examines how
Irish Americans lobbied for peace in Northern Ireland. He discusses various groups of Irish
Americans that formed during those years and how those groups were able to get
President Clinton involved in the peace process (Guelke, 1996). This article gives some
concrete examples of what third-party mediation, as discussed in Herding Cats, looks like in
a peace process. It helped prove the point that third-party actors are important to modern
day peace processes, which is what Herding Cats is all about.
When thinking of long, violent wars, Colombia does not immediately spring to mind. Sadly,
for decades Colombia was the location of a bloody conflict between Left-Wing armies and
the Colombian government (See Figure 3). The major Left-wing armies were Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia–People’s Army (FARC-EP) and the National Liberation Army
(ELN). In their article “Colombia’s Civil Conflict”, Claire Felter and Danielle Renwick give a
detailed background on this conflict. The roots of this conflict trace back to a time known as
La Violencia, which is Spanish for violence. This period lasted from 1948-58—eventually
coming to an end with a power sharing agreement. However, those who embraced a leftleaning political ideology were completely left out of the power-sharing. For this reason,
the FARC and the ELN were founded. From the start, both groups were essentially guerilla
groups; however, their composition was slightly different. FARC was dominated by militant
communists and peasant self-defense groups. ELN, on the other hand, tended to be more
elitist, composed of students, Catholic radicals, and Left-wing intellectuals. While the
ideology and composition of the two groups varied, both were opposed to the privatization
of natural resources, and both claimed to represent the poor of Colombia. Notably, both
groups were classified as terrorists by the United States Department of State. In response
to the creation of FARC and ELN, the 1980s saw the creation of the right-leaning groups.
These Right-wing groups had ties to the state military. The largest of these groups was the
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United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). Largely, these groups were composed of
landowners who organized to protect themselves from the guerilla groups. The AUC, like
FARC and ELN, was also listed as a terrorist group by the State Department. The group
officially disbanded in 2006, yet to this day, splinter groups remain (Felter & Renwick,
2017).
At the end of 2014, Colombia had six million internally displaced people. Nearly 14% of
Colombia’s population were victims of this conflict. In 2011, Colombia registered 7.7
million victims of forced displacement, murder, torture, sexual violence, forced
disappearance, and kidnapping, among other grave violations of human rights. Another
staggering statistic is that between 1970 and 2010 Colombia registered 39,058
kidnappings. FARC was even so bold as to kidnap a presidential candidate. This translates
into someone being kidnapped every twelve hours during those years. The Colombian
government was unfortunately not blameless; it is estimated that the military carried out
5,000 extrajudicial killings (Maldonado, 2017).
With so much violence, at times it seemed unlikely that Colombia would ever be able to
achieve peace. However, the two sides were eventually able to reach a peace deal. Similar,
to the Northern Irish peace process, Colombia benefited from the idea of “ripeness”. After
five decades of violence, the Colombian people were ready for peace. Both sides had too
much to lose from more violence. Another part of what helped the Colombian peace
process was its organized framework, which will be discussed at length later in the paper.
In the “talks about the talks” the two sides agreed to three essential elements. The first
element outlined that the aim of the peace talks was to put an end to armed conflict, rather
than to bring about peace in a positive way. In this way, they were extremely realistic about
what they wanted the peace talks to accomplish, and they were able to manage external
and internal expectations: their goal was simply to end the violence, not promise peacedividends. This is like the discussion in Conflict Resolution Quarterly on how to frame a
peace process. One of the most difficult parts of a peace process is managing the public’s
expectations. Colombia tried to do this by being extremely practical in what they wanted to
achieve. The second element that the two sides agreed to was a discussion agenda of six
points. The points related to things such as agrarian policy, the transitional justice
mechanisms for state military forces, and the national policy in the fight against drugs. The
third element that they agreed to was confidentiality. Through this element, both sides
came to an agreement on how they would interact with the media (Maldonado, 2017).
One of the most difficult topics in the Colombian peace process was victims’ rights. The
framers of the Colombian peace process were determined that victim’s rights should be
central to the entire process, and they created three mechanisms to facilitate this goal. The
first mechanism was the creation of a channel for victims to send proposals to both
delegations. The second mechanism was the appointment of the United Nations, the
Universidad Nacional, and the Catholic Church to create events, which victims could attend,
to express their views and concerns. The final mechanism was allowing the victims to go to
Havana, Cuba, where the talks were taking place, and share their stories. In this way,
Colombia was the first peace process to incorporate victims from the start (Maldonado,
2017).
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It is clear through his writing that Maldonado is convinced that the Colombian peace
process handled the issue of victims’ rights well. However, it remains to be seen whether
this can transition from the theoretical to the practical. Maldonado was a part of the
process, so he does not have an objective view.
Colombia has already started to experience the difficulty in implementing a peace deal.
Recently, FARC experienced serious backlashes in their attempts to run for government in
the 2018 election. According to the peace deal, they are guaranteed ten seats in parliament
if they campaign for the seats. However, when the former head of FARC, Timochenko,
attempted to run for president, he was forced to withdraw his bid due to numerous death
threats, as well as his ill health. While on the campaign trail he was pelted with eggs and
tomatoes. This reaction by the Colombian people could show that Colombians are not
entirely satisfied with the peace deal and are not ready for FARC to become a legitimate
political party. Many Colombians believe that the peace deal was too soft on FARC.
(“Colombia's Farc suspends election campaigning over 'threats' to candidates” 2018). The
trouble that FARC met in campaigning for government is most likely just the beginning of
the difficulty that Colombia will have in implementing their peace deal.
Like the Northern Irish Peace Process, Colombia also utilized third-party actors. In his
article Maldonado discusses how this worked. He is quick to say that the Colombian peace
process was entirely led by Colombians; however, the international community did play an
important role. This fact is well illustrated in Maldonado’s article. For one, he notes that
Cuba hosted the talks. Additionally, the United States, the Union of South American Nations,
the European Union, Germany, the Vatican, and the United Nations all sent envoys to the
peace process, and Colombia also utilized international advisers. Both parties to the talks
had access to an advisory team of international experts who contributed their knowledge
of other peace processes. As such, they were able to help both sides work through
difficulties using lessons that had been learned in other peace processes. Finally, Colombia
also utilized guarantors and observing countries. The guarantors, Norway and Cuba,
ensured that both sides followed the rules agreed to in the framework (Maldonado, 2017).
Both Norway and Cuba had become guarantors because they were committed to the
Colombian peace process. Norway especially provided much of the financial support that
was needed in order for the peace process to be successful (“Norway's peace and
reconciliation efforts to be stepped up,” 2018). Herding Cats discussed the two paradigms
when it comes to third-party mediators, and the Colombian peace process would seem to
largely adhere to the social-psychological paradigm. The third-party actors were observers:
their role was simply to facilitate the peace process, not to lead the two parties through the
process.
At first glance, the Colombian peace process and the Northern Ireland peace process do not
seem to have much in common. However, as case studies, they make an excellent
comparison. Both countries experienced extended periods of violence, and had active
paramilitary groups. The differences are interesting to note as well. Northern Ireland was a
developed country, whereas Colombia is developing. The Northern Irish Peace Process was
between two legitimate governments, whereas the Colombian peace process was between
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a corrupt government and a guerilla group. Finally, the Colombian peace process is still
very much in its beginning stages. Due to the similarities, the Northern Irish peace process
may be used as an example to predict the factors influencing the outcome of the Colombian
peace process.

Third-Party Actors
The involvement of third-party actors has characterized the post-Cold War peace
processes. Almost eighty percent of all modern peace negotiations utilize third parties to
some degree (Fisas, 2015). Herding Cats discusses some of the developments in
international politics that have allowed for this change. The first being the end of the Cold
War, which allowed international organizations to operate free of bipolar constraints. The
second development was the rise of non-governmental organizations (NGOS). The third
development was the recognition of mediation as a relatively cheap option compared to the
use of force, tribunals, etc. Finally, changing international norms have made the use of
mediation a more popular option (Crocker et al., 1999).
The Northern Ireland peace process came to characterize peace processes of the 20th
century because it did the seemingly impossible in ending eight centuries of conflict. The
role that third-party actors played in the process cannot be overemphasized. From
individuals to interest groups, the Northern Irish peace process would probably not have
been successful without these third-party actors.
Groups that had the biggest impact on the Northern Irish peace process were IrishAmerican interest groups. This is hardly surprising given that a 1980 census showed that
eighteen percent of Americans claim Irish heritage (Guelke, 1996). There were various
Irish-American interest groups that attempted to sway the U.S government. The first major
ones were the Irish Northern Aid (NORAID), the Irish National Caucus, and the Friends of
Ireland. From its inception, NORAID was closely linked to the IRA. NORAID was founded in
the early 1970s. Its primary role was fundraising in the United States for the IRA. Gradually,
the Irish National Caucus (INC) came to replace NORAID in the 1980s. The Irish National
Office had offices in Washington D.C. and was much more focused on lobbying. Its lobbying
efforts paid off, as evidenced by the fact that they persuaded Democratic presidential
candidate Jimmy Carter to call for Irish Unity. The INC’s main goal was to convince the
United States to put pressure on the British government over their violation of human
rights in Northern Ireland. Specifically, they were concerned with police interrogation
methods, prison condition, the use of rubber bullets, and the discrimination against
Catholics. Gradually, these interest groups were able to lobby the United States until
President Clinton became invested in the Northern Irish Peace Process (Guelke,1996).
The work of Irish-American interest groups led the United States to become heavily
involved in the Northern Irish peace process. Within this involvement, two individuals
stand out. This first is President Bill Clinton; in 1994, President Clinton gave Sinn Fein
Republican Leader, Gerry Adams, a visa to the United States. This was a risky move for
Clinton, as it risked angering the United Kingdom, an important ally. However, Clinton was
convinced it would be beneficial for the peace process, as it showed the republicans in
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Ireland that there could be benefits for cooperating politically rather than acting out
violently (Mason, 2017). Furthermore, President Clinton visited Northern Ireland three
times during his presidency, making him the first United States president to visit Northern
Ireland while in office. His visits were extremely beneficial in encouraging the people of
Northern Ireland in their attempts at peace. Clinton never considered himself a guarantor
in the peace process, rather he was an enabler. He pressured and encouraged the
negotiators until they reached an agreement (“Northern Ireland,” 2000).
Another individual who was hugely influential in the Northern Irish peace process was
Senator George Mitchell. On November 28, 1995 the British and Irish governments
established an International Body, whose role was to advise on the topic of
decommissioning. They determined that this body would be composed of an American, a
Scandinavian, and a person from the Commonwealth. Senator George Mitchell was chosen
as the American, tasked with chairing the body. Because of their investigations, the body
wrote a report, which contained six principles known as the “Mitchell Principles.” These
principles stated that all parties involved in the negotiations had to affirm their
commitment to democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues to
the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations, and to agree that such
disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission. They
also required them to renounce for themselves and to oppose any effort by others to use
force or threaten to use force to influence the course or the outcome of all-party
negotiations; to agree to abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party
negotiations, and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to
alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree. Lastly, they must urge that
"punishment" killings and beatings stop and take effective steps to prevent such actions
(Crocker et al., 1999). Unfortunately however, after the report was delivered, the IRA
bombed Canary Wharf in London.4 The peace process, although halted, did not stop, and in
some ways the bombing showed how necessary a peace process was. Senator Mitchell was
asked to chair a Plenary Committee. Through much negotiation and debate, the Plenary
Committee decided on an agenda, which acted as a roadmap for the rest of the negotiations.
Thanks in large part to Senator Mitchell’s leadership and structured agenda items, these
negotiations eventually lead to the Good Friday Agreement (Crocker et al., 1999).
Like Northern Ireland, Colombia also endured years of violence followed by a peace
process that contained many false starts. Also, like the Northern Irish peace process, the
Colombian peace process was impacted by various interest groups. Women’s organizations
lobbied the government vigorously until they were also included in the peace process. This
lobbying led the Colombian government and FARC to create a Gender Subcommission. The
commission invited delegations from various interest groups, including Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex (LGBTI) groups, to weigh in on gender issues.
According to Kristian Herbolzheimer, director of Colombia and Philippines programmes at
Canary Wharf was a financial district in London. The IRA announced the end of the ceasefire on February 9,
1996. Hours after this announcement, they detonated a 1,500-pound fertilizer bomb. The bomb killed two
storekeepers and injured over 100 civilians. Furthermore, it caused at least $140 million in damages
(Stevenson, 1996).
4
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Conciliation Resources, the fact that Colombia recognized LGBTI citizen as valid
stakeholders in the peace process probably made Colombia the first country to address the
rights of the LGBTI community in peace negotiations (Herbolzheimer, 2016).
Another interest group that was heavily involved in the Colombian peace process was the
Catholic Church. In the years 1998-2001, 2003, and 2006, local Colombian priests mediated
between the various guerilla groups and the Colombian government. In 1998, some
German Catholic priests helped mediate the conflict. Pope John Paul II himself was heavily
invested in the peace process, as exemplified by his visit in 1986 and his continual calls for
peace (Johnstone, & Svensson, 2013). The Bishops Conference, known as Caritas, has
developed various documents as well as peace initiatives. One of their most visible
initiative was the Week for Peace (Henao, G. & Fabio, H. 2015). Launched in 1987 and
continuing through the peace process, this initiative sought to draw the public’s attention
to the issues facing peace in Colombia and create a period for both sides to make progress
in their peace discussions (Henao, G. & Fabio, H. 2015). Additionally, the Catholic Church, as
well as the United Nations and Universidad Nacional, was appointed to organize regional
events, that allowed victims to have an input on the peace negotiations. These events were
attended by 3,162 victims and 4,617 victims’ organizations, and the parties received
22,146 proposals from them (Maldonado, 2017).
The Colombian peace process benefited from the involvement of various other countries.
Cuba acted as the neutral host of the peace talks and a guarantor country. Norway also
acted as a guarantor country, meaning its job was to ensure that the rules established in the
framework were followed. Chile and Venezuela played the role of observing countries.
Furthermore, the United States, Germany, and the Vatican appointed special envoys to the
peace process (Maldonado, 2017).
The individuals most involved in the Colombian peace process were members of the
conflicting parties. Each side of the conflict could appoint up to ten delegates. FARC’s
delegation was led by its second-in-command, Ivan Marquez, and was entirely composed of
combatants. The Colombian government’s delegation was chosen to reflect the two key
stakeholders: the private and security sectors. As such, the delegation contained one
retired general from the armed forces, and one from the police, one prominent business
leader, who accompanied the chief negotiator, Humberto de la Calle, and the peace
commissioner, Sergio Jaramillo (Herbolzheimer, 2016).
At first glance, the Northern Irish peace process and the Colombian peace process may not
seem to have much in common. The following table shows a statistical comparison of the
two countries.
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Comparison of the Conflicts and Peace Deals in Northern Ireland and Colombia
Northern Ireland

Colombia

Country Population (2017)

1.862,0005

49,292,0006

Years of Conflict

1968-1998

1964-2016

Total Casualties:
Killed:
Abducted:

50,0007
3,5328
179

218,09410
177,30711
39,05812

Displaced Persons

11,00013

4,744,046 – 5,712,50614

Unknown15

489,68716

April 10, 1998

November 29-30, 2016

Victims of Sexual Violence
Date of Peace Agreement

However, both peace processes depended heavily upon third-party actors. As discussed in
the review of the literature, there are two paradigms of third-party mediation in conflicts.
In reality, there is often overlap between these two views. However, the Northern Ireland
peace process overall took a more structuralist approach. An American, Senator George
Mitchell, took a very active role in the process, developing much of the structure and
framework of the negotiations. In many ways he led the two parties through the process. In
5

United Kingdom, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. (2017). 2016 Mid-year Population
Estimates for Northern Ireland. http://www.nisra.gov.uk/sites/nisra.gov.uk/files/publications/MYE16Bulletin.pdf
6 Colombia, Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística. (2018). La población proyectada de
Colombia. Retrieved http://www.dane.gov.co/reloj/
7 Kelters, S. (2013, February). Violence in the Troubles. Retrieved from
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/topics/troubles_violence
8 Sutton, M. (2002, October). An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland. Retrieved from
http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/tables/Status_Summary.html
9 Cobain, I. (2014, May 10). Disappeared but not Forgotten: The Grim Secrets the IRA could not Bury.
Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/may/10/disappeared-ira-troublesnorthern-ireland
10 Colombia, Centro de Memoria Histórica. (2012). Estadísticas del conflicto armado en Colombia. Retrieved
http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/estadisticas.html
11 Civilians - Colombia, Centro de Memoria Histórica. (2012). Estadísticas del conflicto armado en Colombia.
12 Maldonado, A. U. (2017). What is the Colombian peace process teaching the world? New England Journal of
Public Policy, 29(1), 1-7.
13 In Southern Border Counties - Dublin, R. L. (2005, January). All over the place (Rep.). Retrieved
https://www.pobal.ie/Publications/Documents/PEACE All over the place.pdf
14 Colombia, Centro de Memoria Histórica. (2012). Estadísticas del conflicto armado en Colombia.
15 O'Keefe, T. (2017). Policing unruly women: The state and sexual violence during the Northern Irish
Troubles. Women’s Studies International Forum, 62, 69-77. doi:10.1016/j.wsif.2017.03.003
16 Colombia: Women, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and the Peace Process (Rep.). (2013, November).
Retrieved https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ABColombia_Conflict_related_sexual
_violence_report.pdf
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contrast, the Colombian peace process took a more social-psychological approach. The
third-party actors involved in this conflict provided forums for the conflicting parties to
discuss their grievances. The third-party actors involved facilitated the negotiations, but
they did not lead them.
There was also a significant difference in the role religion played within the peace process.
The Catholic Church was able to act more as a third-party mediator in Colombia than it was
in Northern Ireland. According to Naomi Johnstone and Isak Svensson in Belligerents and
Believers: Exploring Faith-based Mediation in Internal Armed Conflicts, “Faith-based
mediation primarily occurs in situations where religion is not part of the conflict itself, in
terms of the incompatibility or in terms of distinguishing the parties’ identities.” In
Northern Ireland, religion was very much at the center of the conflict, thus the Catholic
Church was in no way an impartial third-party, whereas in Colombia they were able to be
so (Johnstone & Svensson, 2013).

Frameworks
When discussing peace processes the importance of frameworks cannot be
overemphasized. The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre defines a negotiation as,
“Being the process by which two or more opposing parties (either countries or internal
actors within a country) decide to discuss their differences within an agreed framework in
order to find a satisfactory solution to their demands” (Fisas, 2015). Thus, without a
framework a peace process is impossible.
The clearest example of the importance of frameworks in the Northern Irish peace process
is the 1995 Framework Documents (Crocker et al., 1999), which laid out the blueprint for
the ensuing peace process that led to the Good Friday Agreement. While the Good Friday
Agreement was open to a referendum, the framework document notably was not. Thus, it
was protected from the politics of anger that existed in the Northern Ireland at the time.
This document institutionalized the three-stranded framework. Strand one referred to
relations within Northern Ireland, strand two referred to relations between Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and strand three referred to the relations between both
islands. This framework made sense of the difficult number of relationships that impacted
the Northern Irish peace process, acknowledging the interconnectedness of the British Isles
by denoting each relationship with a strand. As mentioned in the introduction, the prenegotiation stage is imperative to a peace process as it provides the roadmap that will be
used. This concept is illustrated by the following quote from an Irish government official,
who said that:
We did not think it would serve a useful purpose for everyone to simply show up on
day one [of talks] and that agreement would somehow percolate up from the
bottom. Rather we thought that it was up to the two governments to give guidance.
That’s the background to the Frameworks Document (Ginty, & Darby 2002).
The original framework for the Northern Irish peace process was integral to the peace
process, exhibited by the fact that much of it was incorporated into the Good Friday
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Agreement. It does an excellent job of showing how important it is to come up with a good
framework during the pre-negotiation stage is. Without a good framework, it is highly
unlikely that a peace process will be successful (Mac Ginty, & Darby 2002).
Similar to the Northern Irish peace process, the Colombian peace process also relied
heavily on a good framework. Previous peace processes in Colombia had failed due to the
lack of a realistic framework, as shown in the following figure:
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Taking the lessons learned from previous peace processes, the two conflicting parties were
much more realistic during the Havana negotiations. During the pre-negotiation stage, the
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Colombian government and FARC decided that the main objective was the ending of armed
conflict, significantly narrowing their objectives from previous attempts at peace. At this
time, they also decided the peace process would contain three phases: preparation, conflict
termination, and conflict transformation. Additionally, they decided upon six substantive
issues, which were as follows: rural development, political participation, illicit crops,
victims, conflict termination, and the implementation of the eventual peace process. This
pre-negotiation stage, which took place in secret, resulted in the 2012 Global Agreement
for the Termination of the Armed Conflict, providing the framework for the entire peace
process. Additionally, during this stage, the two parties agreed on the schedule for the
negotiations—the sessions in Havana would last eleven days and would be followed by
short periods intended for internal consultations and preparations for the next round. They
also agreed to release a joint statement providing updates on the peace process after each
round (Herbolzheimer, 2016).
In many ways, the framework for the Colombian peace process was innovative. For
example, it distinguished between conflict termination and transformation. The negotiators
realized that their role, realistically, was to end the conflict. The broader peace-building
process would occur only after the conflict ended and would include every Colombian
(Herbolzheimer, 2016).
The framework was not the only innovative part of the Colombian peace process. Building
upon previous peace process, including the Northern Irish peace process, Colombia was
able to contribute various innovations to peacebuilding. For example, the Colombian peace
process widely utilized international advisers. Each party had access to a team of
international experts. Furthermore, the Colombian peace process was the first peace
process to put victims’ rights front and center. In fact, they devised three mechanisms to do
so. First, was the creation of channels allowing victims to send proposals to both
delegations electronically or through conventional mail. Second, through the help of the
United Nations, the Catholic Church, and the Universidad Nacional, they created forums to
allow victims to express their views. Third, victims were invited to public hearings in
Havana where they could engage with both delegations (Maldonado, 2017). In “What the
Colombian Peace Process is Teaching the Word,” Maldonado, a member of the Colombian
government’s delegation to Havana, said the following:
The design and preparation of the Colombian peace process is setting a new
standard for future peace talks around the world. The Colombian case has shown
that a well-thought-out process can be advantageous to both parties. Most crises can
be solved on the basis of the rules and mechanisms established in the framework
agenda, because this initial agreement gives stability and provides a common
ground and a sense of predictability to the whole negotiation (Maldonado, 2017).
This quote shows the importance of having a good framework for a peace process. Both
Northern Ireland and Colombia benefited from having a clear roadmap for their peace
processes; the framework helped the negotiators understand exactly what they needed to
accomplish. The Northern Irish peace process benefited from the three-strand framework
as it acknowledged the interconnectedness of the people of British Isles. In the same way,
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the framework for the Colombian peace process incorporated six issues that were vital to
both parties. Both frameworks also recognized the goal of the peace process, which was to
end decades of fighting and violence. Peace processes do not occur in a vacuum. The
Colombian peace process benefited greatly from the success of the Northern Irish peace
process, to the extent that it was able to build upon and innovate the idea of a peace
process.

Conclusion
Peace processes are incredibly complex: successful ones are the work of years of hard
work. Today, many peace processes utilize third-party actors and clear frameworks in
order to maximize their chances of success. It is hard to imagine a Northern Irish peace
process without Senator Mitchell, as he played such a crucial role in the mediation.
However, Senator Mitchell would probably not have gotten involved if President Clinton
had not become involved in the Northern Irish peace process, which he did partly as a
result from the tireless lobbying efforts of Irish-Americans. In the same way, without the
supporting countries, it is highly unlikely that the Colombian government and FARC could
have even met. Modern peace processes benefit greatly from mediation from third-party
actors. As in the case of Colombia, these third-party actors can be other countries. Cuba
hosted the peace talks, and Norway acted as a guarantor country, an important role when
tensions rose. Similarly, without clear frameworks both peace processes probably would
have failed.
As the title suggests, peace is a process. As such, a peace deal should not be thought of as
the end of the peace process. In many ways, the peace deal is still the beginning stages.
Often, the most difficult part is the implementation as a peace deal inherently excludes
those most affected and are typically negotiated by a select group. In Comparative Peace
Processes, Jonathan Tonge acknowledges this by saying the following:
The achievement of a peace deal is merely one step towards managing a Conflict.
Resolution of the conditions or divisions which yielded violence requires a much
longer-term effort. Peace processes are thus sustained, non-linear constructions,
beset by regular reversals, given that, at their most comprehensive, they cover
decades of shifts from violence to constitutional politics; the management of
division and ultimately, the resolution of the underlying problems which
precipitated violence (Tonge, 2014).
Bearing this quote in mind, no peace process should be thought of as non-reversible. For
example, factors such as Brexit could impact Northern Ireland and reawaken tensions
between various groups (Connely, 2018). The Colombian peace process is still in its early
stages. It remains to be seen how the presidential elections in May will impact the peace
process. With the disarmament of FARC there is the possibility that other guerilla groups
will simply take their place. Notably, the peace deal was with FARC, not ELN. However,
since peace processes are non-linear, setbacks and difficulties do not equate to failure. In
both of these cases, the parties involved have taken significant strides towards the
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actualization of these agreements. Even if these peace processes experience setbacks, both
cases benefited from invested third-party actors and from clear frameworks that laid out a
blueprint for the peace process.
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Figure 1 - Religious Map of Northern Ireland

Source: Sunil Prasannan, 2003
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Figure 2: Map of Great Britain and Ireland

Source: Denver Public Library
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Figure 3: Map of Colombia including areas of control by actors within the peace process.

Source: Al Jazeera
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